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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE
-----------------------------------------------------X
In the Matter of the Application of
KEVIN WILSON,#96-A-0242,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #44-1-2015-0174.07
INDEX #145378
ORI # NY044015J

-againstTINA STANFORD, Chairwoman,
NYS Board of Parole,

Respondent.
-----------------------------------------------------X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Kevin Wilson, verified on January 7, 2015 and filed in the St.
Lawrence County Clerk’s office on March 13, 2015. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Gouverneur Correctional Facility, is challenging the October 2013 determination denying
him discretionary parole release and directing that he be held for an additional 24
months. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on March 18, 2015 and has received
and reviewed respondent’s Answer and Return, including Confidential Exhibits B, C and
H, verified on May 15, 2015. The Court has also received and reviewed petitioner’s Reply
thereto, verified on June 2, 2015 and filed in the St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on
June 5, 2015.
On December 18, 1995 petitioner was sentenced in Ulster County Court, upon a
plea, to an indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life upon his conviction of the crime of
Murder 2°. After having been denied discretionary parole release on two prior occasions
petitioner made his third appearance before a Parole Board on October 23, 2013.
Following that appearance a decision was issued again denying petitioner discretionary
1 of 10

[* 2]

parole release and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The October
2013 parole denial determination reads as follows:
“PAROLE IS DENIED. AFTER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD AND
INTERVIEW, THE PANEL HAS DETERMINED THAT IF RELEASED AT
THIS TIME, THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT YOU
WOULD NOT LIVE AND REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT AGAIN
VIOLATING THE LAW AND YOUR RELEASE WOULD BE
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF SOCIETY (AND WOULD SO
DEPRECATE THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE CRIME AS TO
UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW). THIS DECISION IS BASED ON
THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: THE INSTANT OFFENSE IS MURDER 2ND
WHEREIN YOU CONSPIRED TO COMMIT A BURGLARY WHICH
RESULTED IN YOUR CO-DEFENDANT BEATING THE VICTIM TO
DEATH WITH A FIRE EXTINGUISHER. NOTE IS MADE BY THIS
BOARD OF YOUR SENTENCING MINUTES, COMPAS RISK
ASSESSMENT, REHABILITATIVE EFFORTS, RISKS, NEEDS, PAROLE
PLAN, LETTERS OF SUPPORT, DISCIPLINARY RECORD AND ALL
OTHER REQUIRED FACTORS.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the October 2013 parole
denial determination was received by the DOCCS Board of Parole Appeals Unit on or
about June 5, 2014. Although the Appeals Unit apparently failed to issue its findings and
recommendation within the four-month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c), a
belated decision on administrative appeal was, in fact, issued on or about April 1, 2015,
after this proceeding had been commenced.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
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article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268,
Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Jackson v. Evans, 118 AD3d 701, Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521
and Zane v. New York State Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848.
Petitioner first argues, in effect, that the Parole Board focused excessively on the
serious nature of the crime underlying his incarceration without adequate consideration
of his rehabilitative efforts. A Parole Board, however, need not assign equal weight to each
statutory factor it is required to consider in connection with a discretionary parole
determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those factors in its written
decision. See Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted 23 NY3d 903, app dismissed
24 NY3d 1052, Valentino v. Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and Martin v. New York State Division
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of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the role
of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to assess whether the Board
gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed the
statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted,
by the facts in the record. Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing process,
given that it is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each factor equally
or grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New York
State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, reviews of the Inmate Status Report (October 2013
Reappearance) and transcript of petitioner’s October 23, 2013 Parole Board appearance
reveal that the Board had before it information with respect to the appropriate statutory
factors, including petitioner’s lack of any prior criminal record, therapeutic/vocational
programing records, COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment Instrument, sentencing minutes,
disciplinary record (no infractions “in about 10 years”) and release plans/community
support in addition to the circumstances of the crime underlying his incarceration 1. The
Parole Board record also indicates that the Board was aware of petitioner’s after-the-fact
cooperation with authorities and his expressions of remorse for the loss of life. The Court,
moreover, finds nothing in the transcript of the October 23, 2013 parole interview to
suggest that the Board cut short petitioner’s discussion of any relevant factor or otherwise
prevented him from expressing clear and complete responses to its inquiries. Indeed,

1

Although petitioner actively participated in the conspiracy to commit the burglary in order to
obtain cash to purchase drugs, the Parole Board was clearly aware that petitioner was not present when the
burglary was committed and, therefore, did not directly participate in the assault that resulted in the victim’s
death.
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before the interview was concluded one of the presiding commissioners inquired of
petitioner as follows: “All right, Mr. Wilson, the last word is yours. Is there anything else
you want this Panel to know?” The following colloquy then occurred:

“A [Petitioner]:

Well, I mean, like you stated, this is my
third Board and, you know, I think that
it’s important to know some of the states
that brings you up to [sic]. Like you can
see, I was 35 years old when this
unfortunate thing happened. I don’t
have a prior criminal history. I’m not a
prior criminal. Yes, I have used drugs
but drug business wasn’t my life. I
worked every day. I supported my
family. But at the time that, you know,
this happened, there was a succession of
things that happened in my life that, you
know, I had given up. And I’m not
trying to make excuses. I’m just saying
that there’s times in your life where
things happen, where you just give up on
yourself and things and that’s where I
was at that time. So I was easy to
manipulate into doing something I knew
I was wrong [sic]. And, again, like I said,
I’m not making excuses for it but, you
know, we all go through a time in our life
when, you know, things just mount up,
and we give up.

Q [Parole Commissioner]:

But the difference is when that happens
to people, they don’t resort to criminal
behavior which, ultimately, causes
somebody else’s death.

A:

No question, not making excuses.”

In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See Pearl v. New York State Division of
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Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. Since the requisite statutory
factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality boarding on impropriety as a result
of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crime underlying petitioner’s
incarceration. Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268, Cruz v.
New York State Division of Parole, 39 AD3d 1060, Sanchez v. Dennison, 21 AD3d 1249
and Rivera v. Travis, 289 AD2d 829.
To the extent petitioner purports to rely on King v. New York State Division of
Parole, 190 AD2d 423, aff’d 83 NY2d 788, the Court finds such reliance misplaced. In
King the Appellate Division, First Department, not only determined that the Parole Board
improperly considered matters not within its purview (penal policy with respect to
convicted murders) but also that the Parole Board failed “ . . . to consider and fairly weigh
all of the information available to them concerning petitioner that was relevant under the
statute, which clearly demonstrates his extraordinary rehabilitative achievements and
would appear to strongly militate in favor of granting parole.” Id at 433. The appellatelevel court in King went on to note that the only statutory criterion referenced by the Board
in the parole denial determination was the seriousness of the crime underlying Mr. King’s
incarceration (felony murder of an off-duty police officer during the robbery of a fast food
restaurant). According to the Appellate Division, First Department, “[s]ince . . . the
Legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se should not preclude parole,
there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent
seriousness of the crime itself.” Id at 433. In July of 2014, however, the Appellate Division,
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Third Department - whose precedent is binding on this Court - effectively determined that
the above-referenced “aggravating circumstances” requirement enunciated by the First
Department in King does not represent the state of the law in the Third Department. See
Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268. In Hamilton it was noted
that the Third Department “ . . . has repeatedly held - both recently and historically - that,
so long as the [Parole] Board considers the factors enumerated in the statute [Executive
Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)] it is ‘entitled . . . to place a greater emphasis on the gravity of [the]
crime’ (Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, 203 (2014), lv granted 23 NY3d 903
(2014) [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]’ . . .” Id at 1271 (other citations
omitted). After favorably citing nine Third Department cases decided between 1977 and
2014, the Hamilton court ended the string of cites as follows: “ . . . but see Matter of King
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 434 (1993), aff’d on other grounds 83
NY2d 788[2 ] (1994) [a First Department case holding, in conflict with our precedent, that
the Board [of Parole] may not deny discretionary release based solely on the nature of the
crime when the remaining statutory factors are considered only to be dismissed as not
outweighing the seriousness of the crime].” 119 AD3d 1268, 1272. The Hamilton court
continued as follows:
“Particularly relevant here, we have held that, even when a petitioner’s
institutional behavior and accomplishments are ‘exemplary,’ the Board may

2

The Court of Appeals in King only referenced the fact that “ . . . one of the [Parole] Commissioners
considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical
treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the
consequences to society if those sentences are not in place. Consideration of such factors is not authorized
by Executive Law §259-i.” 83 NY2d 788, 791. The Court of Appeals, however, did not address that aspect
of the Appellate Division, First Department, decision in King holding that a parole denial determination
must be based upon a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the
underlying crime.

7 of 10

[* 8]

place ‘particular emphasis’ on the violent nature or gravity of the crime in
denying parole, as long as the relevant statutory factors are considered
(Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 AD3d at 905). In so holding we
explained that, despite [the Valderrama] petitioner’s admirable educational
and vocational accomplishments and positive prison disciplinary history,
‘[o]ur settled jurisprudence is that a parole determination made in
accordance with the requirements of the statutory guidelines is not subject
to further judicial review unless it is affected by irrationality bordering on
impropriety’ (id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). We
emphasize that this Court [Appellate Division, Third Department] has
repeatedly reached the same result, on the same basis, when reviewing
denials of parole to petitioners whom we recognized as having exemplary
records and as being compelling candidates for release.” 119 AD3d 1268,
1272 (additional citations omitted).
The Court therefore rejects petitioner’s argument on this point.
The petitioner specifically argues that the Parole Board improperly evaluated his
risk assessment, as developed through utilization the COMPAS Re-Entry Risk Assessment
Instrument. In this regard he notes that the instrument indicated “ . . . a low abscond,

arrest, and felony violence risk . . . It also indicated that [petitioner] has a low history of
violence, prison misconduct, and criminal involvement . . . However, in spite of this
assessment, the Parole Board still considered that [petitioner] was unable to live and
remain at liberty without again violating the law . . .” (References to exhibits omitted).
This Court nevertheless finds that although the Appellate Division, Third Department, has
determined that a risk and needs assessment instrument (such as COMPAS) must be
utilized in connection with post-September 30, 2011 parole release determinations (see
Linares v. Evans, 112 AD3d 1056, Malerba v. Evans, 109 AD3d 1067, lv denied 22 NY3d
858 and Garfield v. Evans, 108 AD3d 830), there is nothing in such cases, or the amended
version of Executive Law §259-c(4), to suggest that the quantified risk assessment
determined through utilization of the risk and needs assessment instrument supercedes
the independent discretionary authority of the Parole Board to determine, based upon its
consideration of the factors set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), whether or not an
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inmate should be released to parole supervision. The “risk and need principles” that must
be incorporated pursuant to the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4), while
intended to measure the rehabilitation of a prospective parolee as well as the likelihood
that he/she would succeed under community-based parole supervision, serve only to
“ . . . assist members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be
released to parole supervision . . .” Executive Law §259-c(4)(emphasis added). Thus,
while the Parole Board was required to consider the COMPAS instrument when exercising
its discretionary authority to determine whether or not petitioner should be released from
DOCCS custody to community-based parole supervision, it was not bound by the
quantified results of the COMPAS assessment and was free to grant or deny parole based
upon its independent assessment of the factors set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)
including, as here, the nature of the crime underlying his incarceration. See Rivera v. New
York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107 and Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc 3d 896, aff’d
117 AD3d 1258, lv denied 24 NY3d 901. See also Lackwood v. New York State Division

of Parole, 127 AD3d 1495.
Finally, petitioner notes four apparently erroneous entries in his COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment Instrument wherein his “Prison Admission Status” is repeatedly
identified as “Parole Violator.” Citing the unreported September 26, 2014 Decision and
Order/Judgment of the Supreme Court, Albany County, in Karlin v. New York State
Board of Parole (Albany County Index No. 543-14), petitioner argues that such erroneous
entries entitle him to de novo parole release consideration since the Parole Board relied
on the COMPAS instrument. The Court finds, however, that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies with respect to this issue since he did not raise it on
administrative appeal. See Nicoletta v. New York State Division of Parole, 74 AD3d
1609, lv dismissed 15 NY3d 867. In any event, there is nothing in the record to suggest
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that the erroneous entries negatively affected the relevant COMPAS Criminogenic Need
Scales nor is there any evidence in the record to suggest that the Parole Board labored
under the mistaken belief that petitioner had previously been returned to DOCCS custody
as a parole violator.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

September 11, 2015 at
Indian Lake, New York

___________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Justice, Supreme Court
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